opportunity to revise the Defense Health Program to improve the medical readiness of Army National Guardsmen while decreasing long-term health care costs. After discussing the organizational culture of the Guard and the barriers this culture creates to medical readiness, this paper describes the challenges of operationalization and past strategies utilized by the National Guard Bureau to improve medical readiness.
Following a review of the national health care environment and reform proposals, this study will suggest policy changes to TRICARE to incorporate the value-based design and the individual health insurance mandate embedded in current legislation.
Specifically, monitoring Soldier use of TRICARE Reserve Select (TRS) to meet the health insurance mandate and changing the TRS benefit by developing incentives for healthy behaviors and eliminating cost sharing for preventive services, will help control health care costs while improving readiness. Regardless of the outcome of the current national debate, leveraging these aspects of proposed legislation and the unique culture of the Guard to implement change will result in a more medically ready, cohesive force.
LEVERAGING NATIONAL HEALTHCARE REFORM TO IMPROVE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD READINESS
Since 1636, the Army National Guard has served its communities in times of need, and the nation in times of war. In 2005, over 40% of Army troop strength in Iraq was contributed by the Guard. 1 Medical readiness, a key component of manning, continues to be a significant challenge for the Army National Guard (ARNG). Cultural barriers to medical readiness must be overcome in order to operationalize the Guard. Additionally, unlike their Active Duty peers, traditional Guardsmen have the same issues accessing healthcare as many Americans. National health care reform provides the Department of Defense (DoD) with a unique opportunity to revise the Defense Health Program (DHP) to improve the medical readiness of Army National Guardsmen while decreasing long-term health care costs for the American people.
In order to meet the force requirements of the current operating environment, the Guard must transform from a strategic reserve to an operational force. This transformation requires not only new ways of manning, equipping and training the force, but fundamental changes in the culture of the Guard.
Failure to address these issues puts at risk not only the war effort, but the cohesion of the Guard as a community-based fighting force.
After discussing the organizational culture of the Guard and the barriers this creates to medical readiness, this paper will describe the challenges of operationalization and past strategies utilized by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) to improve medical readiness. Following a review of the national health care environment and reform proposals, this paper will suggest policy changes, incorporating into TRICARE the value-based design and facilitating the individual health insurance mandate embedded in current legislation. Leveraging these aspects of national healthcare reform and the unique culture of the Guard to implement change will result in a more medically ready, cohesive force.
Organizational Culture
The culture of the Guard is rooted in its nearly 400 years of existence. 2 This heritage and maturity of beliefs underlies a unique culture which is positive and distinct from the Army, but can also create significant barriers to change. 3 In his cross-sectional study of nearly 3000 Guard and Regular Army Soldiers and leaders, Joseph Galioto identified significant similarities between the cultures of the Army and the Guard.
However, he also identified attributes that were more highly associated with the Guard:
loyalty to the unit and organization, and putting Soldiers, unit, or nation before self. 4 These traits reflected a cultural cohesiveness that was consistent with the communitybased nature of the Guard, which he described as its center of gravity. 5 However, cultural cohesion can also create significant barriers to medical readiness, as it favors relationships over qualifications. 6 Like the Army, the Guard's emphasis has been on people rather than equipment, and thus its basic measure has been and end-strength.
As a community-based organization, many Guardsmen already have established relationships outside their Guard affiliation, though school, work, or family. Rather than leveraging these relationships to take care of Soldiers by improving their medical readiness, it fostered a sense of complacency. Guard leaders would not put cohesion at risk by holding Soldiers accountable. 7 However, as a communitybased force, where the individuals may have known or be related to one another, Guard units have had a much more direct role in maintaining end strength through local recruiting and retention. The constant struggle with, and sensitivity to end strength led leaders to hesitate in enforcement of medical readiness standards. 8 In contrast, the Air Force and Navy required their service members to be fully medically ready in order to be paid for annual training, thus making medical readiness a condition of employment.
These reserve components enforced this despite significant out-of-pocket costs to their service members. 9 Historically, the nation relied on the National Guard as a strategic reserve.
Guard leaders have expressed fear that Guardsmen would leave the service rather than pay (able or unable) for their own medical and dental care, negatively impacting end strength. The Guard thus turned a blind eye to medical readiness. 10 As a strategic reserve, the Guard had limited resources and utilized tiered readiness for its units. 11 Soldiers and units expected long periods of training and certification after mobilization to ensure readiness to deploy. 12 Limited time and funding were available at home station for medical readiness activities, leading to an underlying cultural assumption that any Soldier's medical or dental issues would be "fixed at the mobilization site." 13 This Guard culture, built on cohesion over qualifications, with emphasis on end strength and the expectation of limited resources, resulted in the worst levels of medical readiness in the Department of Defense (DoD). 14 The lack of readiness became a significant barrier to integration with the Active Component. 15 Over half of Guardsmen required significant medical or dental treatment in order to qualify for deployment, Operationalizing the Guard
In January 2007, in response to increasing force requirements and the continued need to rely on the reserve components, Secretary of Defense Gates directed the transformation of the Guard from a strategic reserve to an operational force. 20 Rather than having extended periods at mobilization stations to address medical readiness issues, reserve component unit mobilization would be limited to a total of 12 months. In order to maximize "boots on ground" time in theater, units had to arrive at the mobilization station fully medically ready to deploy. Issues that were previously left to "fix at the mobilization site" had to be addressed at home station and certified complete before mobilization. 21 More than any single action, this mandate for change raised the level of urgency, greatly enabling change in the Army National Guard. 22 The organizational structure of the Guard contributes to its unique culture and presents both barriers to and opportunities for change. The Guard has been described as "54 separate combatant commands," as a state or territory's Adjutant General (TAG) exercises authority independent of the NGB. 23 These differentiated subcultures can prove exceedingly difficult to align. 24 However, if able to attain coherence, the power of their directed energies can be harnessed. 25 At NGB, the goal of the ARNG Chief Surgeon's office was to leverage the energies at the state level to facilitate cultural change, now that the culture had been "unfrozen" by the Gates memo. 26 The lack of direct NGB authority over the states necessitated a more collegial relationship, increasing the opportunity for dialogue and learning. 27 Initially, for both the state and mobilization platform, preparing the first brigade to mobilize after the Gates memo was an exercise in learning through trial and error. 28 The Communication of a leader's vision is the first step in organizational change. 32 Communicating vision not just to state medical teams, but other stakeholders became the engine for cultural change that enabled successful home station mobilization readiness. 33 Strategic communication on medical readiness was delivered to multiple audiences by different messengers over time and space. 34 Given the appropriate guidance and resources, the state medical teams became "early adopters" of home station medical readiness, often dragging state and unit leadership along. Tracking and widespread visibility of Unit Status Report (USR) indicators became a powerful tool to enforce behavioral change. 35 Mobilization readiness was non-negotiable, and
highlighting the examples of peers that were successful or unsuccessful was usually all that was necessary to bring line leaders into compliance. In the absence of these effective external motivators to change, the Guard must rely on the most deeply held beliefs in its culture. 38 As noted by Galioto, the Guard's cultural strength lies in its community-based unit cohesion and dedication to service to others. Future programs, policies and strategic communications must emphasize the cognitive dissonance between the espoused value of taking care of Soldiers, and the current theories in use which devalue medical readiness. 39 Basing the need to change on cohesion and community values will in turn impact readiness. Leaders must clearly understand that cross-leveling due to medically non-deployable Guardsmen, rather than medical readiness enforcement, is the biggest threat to cohesion, the center of gravity for the Guard. They must embrace that Soldiers, as the Guard's most important "weapon system," deserve at least as much dedicated attention as vehicles. 40 Motivated by the current operating environment, the Army National Guard has overcome its traditional cultural barriers in order to deploy medically ready units. The
Guard must now leverage this success to truly change its medical readiness culture, improve the baseline medical readiness of all Guardsmen, and complete the transformation from a strategic reserve to an operational force. The current momentum for national healthcare reform provides a unique opportunity to springboard towards this goal.
Healthcare Reform
In every decade since the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, some type of health care reform has been on the American political agenda. 41 Roosevelt was the first to advocate national health insurance as part of his progressive platform. 42 Edward Kennedy introduced his first of many proposals for national health insurance. 46 Candidate Bill Clinton identified health care reform as one of the key issues of his 1992 campaign. Upon election, he convened a commission which recommended reforms to include: mandating employers to provide health insurance to employees; creating regional purchasing alliances to enable the self-employed and uninsured to obtain insurance at group rates; and eliminating denial of coverage for preexisting conditions.
However, neither President Nixon, subsequent administrations, nor Congress supported it. 47 However, the Clinton commission excluded key stakeholders in health reform -physicians, insurers, pharmaceutical manufacturers, employers, and the media. This sleight enabled these groups to develop significant public opposition to the Clinton plan even before it was publically announced, and Congress refused to act on the president's proposal. 48 In Table 1 : DoD and DHP O&M funding for FY00, and FY05 through FY10. 56, 57 As illustrated in table 1, both DoD and DHP budgets have more than doubled during the current conflict, and it would appear that DHP growth mirrors that of Without cost-sharing, utilization can be expected to continue to increase over time. 59 Despite these high costs, the American health industry delivers fragmented care with less than desirable outcomes. Although America spends 50% more than the next As military medical benefits are congressionally mandated entitlements, in a fiscally constrained environment, the growth in DHP expenditures will necessarily crowd out DoD discretionary spending for manning, equipping and training the force, potentially limiting the nation's military strategic options.
highest country, Switzerland, it ranks 46 th in lifespan and 60 th in infant mortality. 60 The
World Health Organization ranks the U.S. 37 th for overall health quality. 61 While nearly 50% of deaths are due to preventable causes, preventive services are underutilized and fraught with racial and gender inequalities. 62 Senator Harkin has stated that America has a sick-care rather than a health care system. 63 Administrative overhead is 14% in the private insurance market, compared to 2% for Medicare and Medicaid. 64 Peter
Orszag, Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has estimated that $700 billion are wasted annually in the American health care system. 65 In addition to this waste, forty-seven million Americans are uninsured and 25 million underinsured. 66 There is great variation in insurance coverage, with a high of 90% in Minnesota and a low of 73% in New Mexico. 67 The uninsured fall predominantly into two groups: low wage workers and healthy young adults. Twenty-five percent choose to be uninsured. 68 Fully half of the uninsured are thought to be able to afford insurance. 69 The remainder has an income too high to qualify for Medicaid but too low to afford private insurance, or has a pre-existing condition. 70 As a true reflection of America, 20% of reserve component (RC) service members are uninsured, including a third of junior enlisted. 71 The U.S. is the only wealthy industrialized nation without universal healthcare. 72 American health behaviors also contribute to the spiral of increasing health care
costs. Fully two thirds of Americans are overweight or obese, a 47% increase from the 1960's. 73 The obese spend 42% more in health care consumption than their non-obese peers. 74 Obesity related expenditures are responsible for 27% of the increase in health care costs from 1987 to 2001, with total costs estimated at $117 billion per year. 75, 76 The fourfold increase in childhood and adolescent obesity puts the future health of both the nation and its citizens at risk. 77 Despite a culture of fitness, the military is facing its own challenges with health behaviors. In one study, 60% of men and 40% of women in the Army had body mass indices (BMI) greater than 25, and thus are considered overweight. 78 Among new military recruits, 20-30% of males and 30-50% of females were too overweight for enlistment (the range being due to service-specific requirements). 79 Hispanic men and African-American Women were at the highest risk for disqualification for being overweight. 80 At 32%, the Army National Guard has the highest prevalence of smokers of any service or component, and is well above the national average of 21%. 81 In training impacts alone, smoking costs the military more than $130 million a year. 82 In response to these challenges, states, businesses, and the insurance industry have embraced value-based design (VBD). VBD seeks to increase the amount of heath care gained relative to the amount spent, and has four main components: adjusting cost-shares to reflect clinical benefit; reducing cost-shares for those at highest risk; incentives for behavioral change; and data collection to study outcomes. 83 It is estimated that 40% of employers are developing incentives for healthy behaviors. 84 States are also adopting VBD to incentivize healthy behaviors for their populations. Alabama provides a $25 per month premium discount to employees who decrease health risks. 90 Florida gives $125 per year in drug store credits to Medicaid beneficiaries who participate in health promotion activities. 91 In a controversial program in West Virginia, Medicaid beneficiaries were changed to a basic plan which provided only essential services. However, if enrollees signed a contract to improve health behaviors, they received credits in a "healthy rewards" account and increased access to enhanced healthcare services. 92 Cost savings associated with VBD could be substantial, if the programs are successful. Return on investment for health promotion programs has ranged from $4.73
to $1 for each dollar spent. 93, 94 In 1999, it was estimated that a 10% weight loss resulted in a two to seven month increase in life expectancy, and a decrease in lifetime medical costs of $2200 -$5300. 95 Although premium differences based on behaviors may promote equity and efficiency, ethical concerns also exist. 101 The goal of improving employee and family health is motivated by both beneficence (doing good) and economics. 102 Just as safely features on a car may encourage more risk taking behaviors while driving, by providing a safety net, health insurance can encourage or increase the risk for smoking, obesity, and decreased exercise. 103 Lower socioeconomic groups, as well as junior enlisted service members, are at the highest risk for unhealthy behaviors, and thus can be negatively impacted by monetary coercion. 104 In turn, paternalism by states, employers or insurers can be viewed as either positive or dangerous. 105 In the case of West Virginia, patient advocates decried the complexity of a program which provides services to the most vulnerable health and literacy-challenged population. 106 Lastly, in these programs individual health information is being utilized by employers and insurers, raising privacy concerns. 107 Current privacy law limits the scope and potential impact of VBD policies. While the intent of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) was to standardize financial transactions, it is better known for its privacy protections. HIPAA allows a premium discount of up to 20% for participation in health promotion programs. 108 Employers and insurers would like to see the limit on rebates increased to 50%, as the external costs (in increased premiums to all insured) of obesity and smoking are estimated at $150 and $1400 per person per year, respectively. 109 Further theoretical concerns of discrimination exist, however no suits have been won against VBD programs under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Insurance mandates are thought to stabilize private insurance markets, compel rational decision making by consumers, and reduce freeriding. 111 The Massachusetts mandate forces individuals and families to show proof health insurance or face potential tax penalties equal to the lowest insurance premium in the state's insurance pool. 112 A state agency, the Commonwealth Connector facilitates the buying, selling, and administration of private health insurance for individuals and families. 113 This system mirrors successful systems in the Netherlands and Switzerland, where, like America, both private insurers and the government fund the health system. 114 Mandating health insurance increases the size of the pool, forcing young, healthy individuals to enter the premium pool to bear their proper share of community risk. 115 This decreases the risk to insurers of adverse selection of high risk individuals, enabling the elimination of exclusions for pre-existing conditions. Such mandates also facilitate VBD, as insurers in the aggregate have a long-term interest to maintaining a healthy population, thus reducing costs. 116 The residents of Massachusetts backed the mandate at its inception, and support has grown each year. 117 Massachusetts has expanded health insurance coverage to 355,000 previously uninsured people, demonstrating a feasible, acceptable and suitable course of action for the nation. services that should be incorporated into routine care. 120 Elimination of cost sharing for preventive services in TRS will increase compliance with PHA recommendations and improve individual service member readiness for deployment. Individual readiness aggregates to collective ARNG readiness as an operational force. To remain cost neutral to the government, the rate structure for TRS could be adjusted to offset the expense of eliminating cost-shares for preventive services.
In addition to improving the readiness of operational forces, this proposal has potential cost benefits for the future. Not every Guardsman will choose to remain in the service and be eligible for TRICARE retirement benefits at age 60. However, prevention and early diagnosis are cost-saving in the long term. Although these savings may not be captured by the DHP, the savings for those that retire will be significant. For those who do not retire or continue to use the military health system, the savings should be recouped by the government when they become Medicare eligible at age 65.
Second, in order to maximize the effect of value based design, legislation should be passed to enable TRICARE to develop health behavior incentives as allowed by HIPAA. Using data from the PHA on weight and smoking, service members should be offered monetary incentives to make lifestyle changes -such as reducing or waiving the $50 per month enrollment fee in TRS. Changes in health behavior could greatly decrease the prevalence of smoking and obesity-related disease in the Guard, improving medical readiness for deployment. These behavior changes should significantly lower health care costs for these individuals, both within the DHP, and the nation at large. Again, to remain cost neutral to the government, the rate structure for TRS could be adjusted to offset the expense of providing these incentives. However, if individual insurance mandates in proposed national legislation are adopted universal health care coverage for Guardsmen could be achieved without automatic enrollment. 133 The rate of TRS enrollment in Massachusetts has increased significantly compared to other states since the implementation of its health insurance mandate ( figure 1, below) . The national insurance mandate in current legislation may cause a similar rise in TRS enrollment nationwide, significantly increasing costs to the DoD. contributions to medical readiness. In light of this, any proposal for modification of the benefit structure must be cost-neutral in the short term and cost-saving over time.
Similarly, the process of modifying TRICARE benefits is fraught with difficulties.
Changes of this magnitude would require new legislation, a procedure that takes years when initiated within DoD. The proposals above also target only reserve component service members. Much greater savings and health benefits would be realized if changes reflecting value-based design also applied to family members and retirees.
However, this may increase opposition to the proposal. As the nation recognizes valuebased design's ability to control health care costs, support for comprehensive changes to the TRICARE benefit will develop in congress, the DoD, and among beneficiaries.
Conclusion
Three policy proposals have been made with the potential to improve Guard readiness, ground change in the Guard culture of cohesion, and decrease health care cost growth. The DoD has the opportunity to use the momentum of the current health care reform environment to make fundamental changes to the Defense Health Program and the TRICARE benefit.
Regardless of the outcome of the current health care reform debate, legislation should be proposed to incorporate the principles of value-based design into TRICARE Reserve Select, specifically eliminating cost-sharing for preventive services, and developing incentives for healthy behaviors. These benefit changes can be accomplished without increasing current costs to the DoD, and have the potential for significant cost savings in the future. The DoD should monitor the adoption and implementation of the individual health insurance mandate to facilitate universal health coverage of Guardsmen, while closely tracking enrollment in TRS. Together, these changes will improve baseline readiness, decrease cross-leveling, and increase cohesion in the Guard -its most important cultural attribute.
General Von Steuben wrote that a commander's greatest responsibility is the preservation of Soldier health. 135 Guard leaders must leverage the changes proposed above to improve the health and well-being of their Soldiers. We owe our Guardsmen nothing less.
